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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Reapportionment At The County Level
Moody v. Flowers'
The Supreme Court has recently considered four cases raising the
question of whether the "one man-one vote" rule of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, as enunciated in Reynolds v.
Sims, 2 applies to apportionment at the local level of government. The
Court, by the process of exclusion, has narrowed the question but has
allowed it to remain unanswered for the time being. In Sailors v.
Board of Education,3 the Court decided that even if Reynolds were to
control at the county level, it would apply only to the election of legis-
lative bodies and would not affect school boards, the functions of which
are essentially administrative.4 In Dusch v. Davis,' a Virginia Beach
1. 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. 387 U.S. 105 (1967), aff'g 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
4. Involved was a Michigan plan under which the county board of education,
which functions essentially as an administrative body rather than in a legislative
capacity, was selected by delegates from local school boards. Each local board had
one vote, irrespective of population. It was argued that this system of choosing county
board members paralleled the county-unit system which was invalidated under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
1963), and that it violated the constitutional precepts of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
33 (1964). The Court found no constitutional reason why state or local officers of
the non-legislative character involved could not be chosen by the governor, by the
legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by election. "At least as
respects non-legislative officers," the Court said, "a State can appoint local officials
or elect them or combine the elective and appointive systems .... As to the applica-
tion of the Reynolds doctrine, the Court concluded that "[slince the choice of members
of the county school board did not involve an election and since none was required
for these non-legislative offices, the principle of 'one man-one vote' has no relevancy."
5. 387 U.S. 112 (1967), rev'g Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966).
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plan calling for election of all of the city's eleven councilmen at large,
but requiring that one of the councilmen reside in each of the city's
seven boroughs, which varied widely in population, was held to be
valid. The Court said that the plan satisfied the constitutional test
under the equal protection clause, which proscribes invidious discrimi-
nation, because the councilmen represented the city at large and not
merely the boroughs in which they resided." The basic issue has now
been delineated and may be expressed as follows: Must the election of
members of local governmental bodies which function primarily as
legislative rather than administrative bodies comply with the "one man-
one vote" rule of the equal protection clause if those members are
elected by the electors of their respective districts? The Court post-
poned confrontation of this issue until a later date when it vacated
the decrees in Moody v. Flowers' and Board of Supervisors v. Bianchi'
on jurisdictional grounds. Because the district court in Moody v.
Flowers discusses this question with some degree of clarity, and be-
cause the problems of county reapportionment presented in Moody
are fairly typical of those throughout the country, an attempt will be
made to analyze the "one man-one vote" rule as it applies to local
legislative bodies by a discussion of that case, the history which en-
gendered it, and the decisions which are likely to determine its future.
In Moody, the plaintiff, a citizen of Alabama, contended that the
act which divided Houston County, Alabama, into election districts
and apportioned membership of the county board was unconstitutional
when tested by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
6. Since article VII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution provides for an at-large
election of county commissioners similar to the Virginia Beach plan approved, there
is now little question of the constitutionality of Maryland county apportionment plans
for election of the various county commissioners. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Dusch, the Maryland Court of Appeals heard three cases involving the
constitutionality of county apportionment schemes. In Montgomery County Council
v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164 (1966), the court held that a scheme which
provided that each of five councilmen must come from the district of his residence,
although elected by all the voters of the county, was unconstitutional because of the
extreme variance in population in the five residency districts. The court, on little
authority, said at 639, that "[t]here remains little doubt that the one man-one vote
principle so fully articulated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ... is now applicable
to political subdivisions of a state." The bases for holding a residence requirement
unconstitutional where the residence districts greatly vary in population were the
decisions of Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) and Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d
495 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). Now that Davis v. Dusch has been
reversed on the exact point for which it was cited in Montgomery County Council v.
Garrott, the latter decision has been stripped of much of its vitality. Ironically, the
Supreme Court relied on the language of Fortson v. Dorsey for its conclusion that
at-large voting cures the defects which result from malapportioned residence districts.
Relying on the precedent it set in Garrott, the court of appeals affirmed in a per
curiam opinion in McGinnis v. Board of Supervisors, 244 Md. 65, 222 A.2d 391 (1966),
that an election of county commissioners to be held in Harford County where resi-
dence districts were malapportioned as to population would be unconstitutional. In
Gray v. Board of Supervisors, 243 Md. 657, 222 A.2d 176 (1966), the court applied
the one man-one vote principle to a scheme for the election of county councilmen but
found no invidious discrimination present in the Baltimore County apportionment plan
because no significant population disparities were shown to exist between the resi-
dence districts.
7. 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
8. 256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
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ment.9 Houston County is divided into five election districts each of
which is represented on the five-member County Board of Revenue and
Control by a member elected by the qualified electors of the district of
which he is a resident. The city of Dothan, which comprises District
No. 5, has a population of 31,440, which is about sixty-one per cent of
the total county population and accounts for sixty-nine per cent of the
total assessed value of the property within the county.
Proscribed discrimination was argued by the plaintiff because
sixty-one per cent of the population of the county, owning sixty-nine
per cent of the assessed value of the property therein, were represented
by only one of five Board members and, therefore, had only a twenty
per cent voice in the levying of taxes and the expenditure of monies
collected therefrom. The three-judge federal district court decided in
a split decision that the complaint should be dismissed without preju-
dice because,
. . . so long as the people of a state are afforded equal protection
by true equality of representation in the state legislature the courts
ought not to interfere with county governments of limited, as dis-
tinguished from general, power, and which have been created by
the legislature as involuntary political subdivisions of the state.10
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court considered the thresh-
old question of whether the three-judge district court had been prop-
erly convened. The Court, looking to the applicable jurisdictional
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, concluded that prior constructions of the
section had established that a three-judge panel is not to be convened
where matters of purely local concern are the subject matter of the
suit. The Court pointed out that the Alabama statute which the plain-
tiff was seeking to enjoin related solely to the affairs of one county
and also stated that the fact that state officials were named in the suit
would in no way affect the result. The Court therefore held that
since the three-judge court had been improperly convened, the appeal
should have been taken in the court of appeals. Reasoning that the
appeal period might have run by the date of its decision, the Court
vacated the decree and remanded the cause to the court which had
heard the case below. The lower court was directed to enter a fresh
decree from which the appellant might perfect a timely appeal.
Plaintiff's action requesting reapportionment represents a recur-
ring manifestation of the "one man-one vote" principle first enunciated
9. "Apportionment and districting must be differentiated. Apportionment is the
process by which legislative seats are distributed among units entitled to representa-
tion; districting is the establishment of the precise geographical boundaries of each
such unit or constituency." NEw YORK CITIZEN'S COMMITTE ON RZAPPORTIONMENT,
REPORT To GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER 25 (1964). Since most courts do not distinguish
between problems of districting and apportionment and since constitutional require-
ments must be met whether apportionment or districting is the issue, Seaman v.
Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965), the terms will
be used interchangeably in this discussion.
10. 256 F. Supp. at 200.
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in Baker v. Carr." Baker, in holding that a court might properly con-
sider the extent to which state legislative apportionment schemes con-
form to constitutional requirements, 2 reversed the ruling enunciated
in Colegrove v. Green,'" that such matters were political questions.
The 1964 Reapportionment Decisions, Reynolds v. Sims1 4 and its five
companion cases, 5 "held that seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature are required, under the Equal Protection Clause, to be
apportioned substantially on a population basis."' A week after
Reynolds, the Court handed down ten memorandum decisions in which
it found state apportionment schemes unacceptable. 1" The impact of
having fifteen state legislatures declared unconstitutionally apportioned
in one week's time was felt throughout the country, and as a result,
a comprehensive reevaluation of state apportionment was commenced
with vigor.' 8
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. An extensive list of cases responding to Baker appears in McCloskey,
Foreword: The Reapportionment Cases, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54, 56 n.14 (1962).
13. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal requesting
that Illinois officials be enjoined from proceeding with an election of Congressmen
because the Congressional districts were malapportioned. Justice Frankfurter, in the
majority opinion, in which he was joined by only two other Justices, stated:
"[Elffective working of our government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly
political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination. . . .Courts ought
not to enter this political thicket." Id. at 552, 556. See also South v. Peters, 339
U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). Cf. Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), where the Court found the political question doctrine
to be no barrier in ruling that an Alabama statute redefining the boundaries of
Tuskegee, Alabama, was violative of the fifteenth amendment because of the resulting
discrimination against Negro voters.
Prior to Colegrove v. Green, "in the few instances before 1946 where the
court had occasion to pass directly upon alleged apportionment and districting abuses,
the court acted without hesitation, both in taking jurisdiction and in providing effective
relief." R. McKAY, RZAPPORTIONMENT: THi LAW AND POLITICS Ov EQUAL REPRE-
SENTATION 65 (1965). But see Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932) ; Koenig v.
Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
14. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
15. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado)
Roman V. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678(1964) (Virginia); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964), which reversed
the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals and held that neither house of the
Maryland Legislature, even after the 1962 legislation apportioning the House of
Delegates, was apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to be constitutionally
sustainable; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York). See
Michener, The History of Legislative Apportionment in Maryland, 25 MD. L. Rtv. 1
(1965).
16. Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674 (1964).
17. See Beadle v. Scholle, 377 U.S. 990 (1964) (Michigan). The Supreme Court
by denying certiorari left standing the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in
Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962) which held Michigan's 1952
apportionment amendment to be discriminatory. Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964)(Iowa); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964) (Connecticut); Hearne v.
Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964) (Idaho); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964)(Michigan) ; Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964) (Illinois); Williams v. Moss,
378 U.S. 558 (1964) (Oklahoma); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964) (Ohio);
Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (Washington); Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S.
553 (1964) (Florida).
18. Cases are cited in R. MCKAY, RzAPPORTIONMENT: TIE LAW AND POLITICS
OP EQUAL RXYRESNTATION 274-75 (1965) (appendix). See also Annot., 12 L. Ed. 2d
1282, 1289-1304 (1964).
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The "pregnant"' case of Baker v. Carr now claims among its
progeny cases calling for the application of the "one man-one vote"
principle to local governmental bodies. However, because these de-
cisions were born without the aid of the eminent legal obstetricians
that delivered the Reapportionment Cases of 1964, their vitality re-
mains uncertain. Bound by no compelling precedents, 20 courts must
resolve two major issues in each case raising this question. First, do
the Supreme Court's rulings on the apportionment of state legislatures
apply to the states' political subdivisions? Second, if the principles
expressed in those decisions do apply, is the case at bar an appropriate
one for their application?
In dismissing the complaint, the Moody 1 court answered both
of the above questions in the negative. It discovered no Supreme Court
decisions suggesting "a basis for judicial intervention in a state's
geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political sub-
divisions" 2 and found no facts in the instant case "to justify penetra-
tion of the 'political thicket.' "123
Prior to Moody, other courts had answered both questions in the
affirmative. In State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 4 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute specify-
ing the scheme for the composition of a county board of supervisors.
In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the court rejected a number of
arguments in support of the proposition that "one man-one vote" does
not apply to local bodies of the nature of the county board in question.
It was argued that because the composition and powers of such boards
are statutory rather than constitutional in origin, the equal protection
clause does not apply. It was also contended that the question was
reserved to the state under the dictates of the tenth amendment so long
as the United States Supreme Court does not expressly declare that
the fourteenth amendment applies to county board membership. The
state also raised the argument that "one man-one vote" only applies to
independent governmental entities deriving their power directly from
the people, which, of course, is not the nature of counties. In reply
to this concluding argument, which essentially states that counties are
"arms of the state" and therefore immune from the commands of the
equal protection clause, the court stated:
Characterizing counties as "political subdivisions created to per-
form functions of the state locally and existing as a result of
the superimposed will of the state" or as "pure auxiliaries of the
state" or as "an arm of the state" or "local organizations" which
19. Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW &
CONTrMP. PROB. 329, 330 (1962).
20. The highest authority on the issue of local apportionment, left unchanged by
the Supreme Court rulings, is a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which relied
on Reynolds in holding that local governmental bodies must comply with the equal
representation formula enunciated by the Supreme Court. Ellis v. Mayor and City
Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
21. 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
22. Id. at 199.
23. Id.
24. 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1964).
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"rank low down in the scale or grade of corporate existence," or
quasi municipal corporations .. . is not determinative of whether
the 14th Amendment applies to their composition when the mem-
bers of a county board are determined by the elective process. 2 5
In Seaman v. Fedourich8 the New York Court of Appeals utilized
the characterization of the county as an "arm of the state" as a posi-
tive principle from which it reasoned that since the state "may exercise
its legislative powers only in a body constituted on a population basis,
any general elective municipal organ to which it delegates certain of
its powers must, by a parity of reasoning, be subjected to the same
constitutional requirement. ' 27 The judicial support for this position is
impressive. With few exceptions, 28 most state29 and federal8" cases which
have tested the constitutionality of the apportionment plans of local
governmental units have applied the principle of equal representation.
Another consideration relating to the issue of whether the Reynolds
principles are to be applied to counties may be described as the "make
haste slowly" doctrine. The majority in the instant case felt it not
within their province
...to forecast the likelihood that the Supreme Court will ulti-
mately extend the principles of Reynolds v. Sims . . .to the tens
of thousands of subordinate political units of the states8' to which
have been delegated some power to which the label "legislative"
may be attached.8 2
25. Id. at 255.
26. 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
27. Id. at 782.
28. See, e.g., Reed v. Mann, 237 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Johnson v.
Genesee County, 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
29. Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46 Cal. Rptr.
617 (1965) (applying state statute requiring redistricting of California counties);
Henderson v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d 883, 390 P.2d 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964);Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal. 2d 318, 384 P.2d 421, 33 Cal. Rptr. 101(1963); Knudsen v. Klevering, 377 Mich. 666, 141 N.W.2d 120 (1966); Brouwer v.
Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966); Hanlon v. Towey, 274 Minn. 187,142 N.W.2d 741 (1966); Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 N.J. Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150 (Ch.
Div. 1965); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444(1965). Cf. Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1966), review
granted, 35 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. June 13, 1967), holding that although counties
need not be redistricted into commissioner districts solely on the basis of population,
a population disparity cannot be sustained against a showing of discrimination, fraud,
arbitrariness, or abuse of discretion.
30. Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 112 (1967);
Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965); Lynch v. Torquato,343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965) (dictum) ; Sailors v. Board of Education, 254 F. Supp. 17(W.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Delozier v. School Bd., 247 F. Supp.
30 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
31. The 1962 census of governments found that 91,186 governmental units exer-
cise state delegated powers in the United States. BURAU OP CENSUS, 1965 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT Ol THE UNITXD STA S 419. Even if reapportionment were to be limited
to general function units with legislative powers 3,043 counties, 18,000 cities, towns
and villages, and 17,142 townships would probably be affected.
32. 256 F. Supp. at 200. Accord, Knudsen v. Klevering, 377 Mich. 666, 141
N.W.2d 120 (1966). Concurring in part with a holding that the Muskegon County
Board of Supervisors was unconstitutionally apportioned, Black, J., said: "In today's
specific circumstances, it is better judgment on the part of an inferior court to refrainfrom determination of an unprecedented Federal question pending formal declaration
1967]
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It therefore read a warning to "make haste slowly" into the Supreme
Court's refusal to hear a case raising the issue of whether the federal
constitution requires local governmental bodies below the state level
to be apportioned on a population basis. In Glass v. Hancock County
Election Commission,33 the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to en-
join the holding of an election for supervisors in a malapportioned34
county on the ground that there was available an adequate remedy at
law, namely, statutory procedures for effecting redistricting. The
Supreme Court's dismissal of the Glass appeal was presumably based
on the existence of adequate state grounds. It would seem, therefore,
that the dissent in Moody was correct in finding the Supreme Court's
disposition of Glass neither "controlling [n]or indicative" of the
course which the Moody court should follow. 5
After concluding that the principles of Reynolds do not apply at
the county level, the Moody court directed its attention to the issue of
whether the present fact situation would call for judicial action if the
Supreme Court's decisions did in fact apply to the apportionment of a
state's political subdivisions. According to the majority in Moody,
there must exist one of three types of serious wrongs to justify judicial
penetration of the "political thicket :"
[1] the long continued failure of a legislature through inertia,
apathy or wilful refusal to -reapportion itself in obedience to the
mandate of the state law, [2] the whimsical relocation of the
boundary lines of a local government for the obvious purpose of
depriving Negroes of their right to vote, or [3] the absence of
a political remedy resulting from the "stranglehold" of a minority
on the legislative processes.3
6
While the Supreme Court has sustained judicial action when these
wrongs were found to exist, the court in the instant case overlooked
the fact that the Court has never refused to act because of their absence
when a case of malapportionment was otherwise made out. In Davis
v. Mann, 7 the Court made it clear that the failure of a legislature
to reapportion itself is not a prerequisite to judicial intervention. In
Davis, the Court reviewed the apportionment scheme of the Virginia
legislature, notwithstanding the fact that in accordance with a Virginia
of controlling law by Federal authority." 141 N.W.2d at 121. Contra, State ex rel.
Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1964) :
We find no merit in the argument that unless the United States supreme court
expressly first determines the equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment
applies to county-board membership, the 10th Amendment reserving powers to
the state not delegated to the United States is applicable. This argument over-
looks the fact that it is the duty of this court to decide questions properly pre-
sented to it whether they have been expressly decided by the United States
supreme court or not and further since Art. 1, Sec. 1, of our constitution is the
equivalent of the 14th Amendment of the United States constitution, the effect of
that amendment is necessarily involved in construing our state constitution.
33. 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963), appeal dismissed, 378 U.S. 558 (1964)
(per curiam).
34. A clear case of malapportionment was made out where one district in the
county had a larger population than the other four combined.
35. 256 F. Supp. at 202.
36. Id. at 199.
37. 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
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constitutional requirement, the state legislature had reapportioned itself
in 1932, 1942, 1952 and 1962.
As to the second type of serious wrong, Mr. Justice Stewart, in
characterizing the 1964 Reapportionment Cases, made it clear that
those cases were unlike Gomillion v. Lightoot88 where the relocation
of boundaries was for the obvious purpose of depriving Negroes of
their right to vote. Reynolds and its kin "have nothing to do with
denial or impairment of any person's right to vote. Nobody's right to
vote has been denied .... [or] restricted. Nobody has been deprived
of the right to have his vote counted. . .. ""
The recognition of the third classification has led to the conten-
tion in many of these cases that there exists a political remedy for
effectuating reapportionment and that therefore courts should not in-
tervene. The argument has usually been rejected by the courts.4" In
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly,4 the Court held that de-
parture from population-based representation may not be justified by
the fact that a non-judicial political remedy, such as initiative or refer-
endum, either caused the adoption of a legislative apportionment plan
or was available to change it.42 That a plan was approved by the
majority of the voters is without federal constitutional significance,
if the plan fails to satisfy the basic requirements of the equal protec-
tion clause.
The available political remedy to which the instant court referred
the plaintiff is far less effective and immediate than the referendum
procedures deemed insufficient in Lucas. The Moody majority said
that since sixty-one per cent of the qualified voters of Houston County
resided in the under-represented city of Dothan, they "[had] the power
at the ballot box to elect representatives to the state legislature and
through them, under the prevailing rule of local courtesy, obtain the
desired redistricting."43 Unfortunately the logic of idyllic justice rarely
finds its correlative in reality; the revered "power at the ballot box"
upon which the majority relies has often been undermined by general
apathy and self-serving political structures.
In determining whether there exists such malapportionment as
would call for judicial remedy, some standard must be selected by
38. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
39. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 744 (1964) (dissent).
40. See Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd,
352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1964). The district court held that approval by voters of a
city council apportionment plan could not by itself validate the plan under the equal
protection clause. But since there was ample time before the next election, the court
permitted the city council to propose a valid scheme to the voters while the court
retained jurisdiction. Such a plan was recently approved under the name of the Bard
Plan in the Maryland gubernatorial election of November, 1966. But see Bianchi v.
Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 15 (1965),
where the district court refused to require equal population reapportionment of the
County Board of Supervisors before an attempt was made to reach the same result
through the county political process or a reapportioned state legislature, although it
retained jurisdiction on the merits.
41. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
42. "Except as an interim remedial procedure justifying a court in staying its
hand temporarily, we find no significance in the fact that a nonjudicial, political
remedy may be available for the effectuation of assorted rights to equal representa-
tion ..... Id. at 736.
43. 256 F. Supp. at 200.
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which the population disparities can be compared. The majority in
the instant case found that the test of Reynolds is not one of mathe-
matical precision and concluded that "[the numerical imbalance
demonstrated by simply statistics falls far short of proving invidious
discrimination. '44
Prior to Reynolds v. Sims, courts were divided on the issue of
granting relief under a claim of county malapportionment. 4' The
trend today is to apply the principle of equal representation to political
subdivisions that (1) exercise general governmental functions and
(2) are designed to be controlled by the voters of the geographic area
over which the municipality has jurisdiction. 46 Even prior to the recent
Supreme Court decisions, there was general agreement as to what
types of governmental bodies should fall within the purview of the
"one man-one vote" precept; disagreement persists as to the legal basis
for such a conclusion.
One line of cases, which includes State ex rel. Sonneborn v.
Sylvester4 7 and Seaman v. Fedourich,4 8 has drawn a parallel between
the state legislature and the county board of supervisors as law-making
bodies and has concluded that no qualitative distinction exists between
their functions sufficient to justify applying the principle of equal
representation to one but not the other. The logic of this position is
at once both expansive and limiting. It is expansive in that it repre-
sents an extension of the doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims to an entirely
new level of political bodies. However, this line of cases has been
decided on the basis of the functional similarities of state legislatures
and county boards upon which legislative functions have been con-
ferred. This basis for decision therefore confines the scope of Reynolds
to law-making bodies and in this respect is restrictive.49
44. Id. at 199. The Supreme Court said in Dusch that if "Reynolds v. Sims
controls, the constitutional test under the Equal Protection Clause is whether there is
an 'invidious' discrimination." 387 U.S. at 116.
45. Compare Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 43 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949),
appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam) and Glass v. Hancock County
Election Comm'n, 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963), appeal dismissed, 378 U.S.
558 (1964) (per curiam), with Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal. 2d 318, 384
P.2d 421, 33 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1963) and State ex rel. Scott v. Masterson, 173 Ohio St.
402, 183 N.E.2d 376 (1962).
46. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text. See also Seaman v. Fedourich,
16 N.Y2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965) ; State ex rel. Sonneborn v.Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965). Cf. Delozier v. Tyrone Area
School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. 1965), where a non-elective school board washeld unconstitutionally apportioned; Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141
N.W.2d 98, 117 (1966).
47. 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965).
48. 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
49. See Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967) aff'g 254 F. Supp.
17 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Brouwer v. Bronkema, (Mich. Civ. t. Sept. 11, 1964),
reprinted in 13 National Municipal League Court Decisions on Legislative Reappor-
tionment 81 (1956), aft'd, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966). There the court
based its decision on the following chain of arguments:
1. The fourteenth amendment applies to the State and to every governmental
agency or instrumentality of the State which exercises powers delegated to it
by the State.
2. The County is a governmental instrumentality or division of the State
and the board of supervisors is the legislative body of the County. The board
exercises legislative powers delegated to it by the State.
3. The State may exercise its legislative powers only in a legislative body
apportioned on a population basis and if it delegates a part of those powers, it
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Disagreeing with the foundation of the above decisions, the
Supreme Court of Michigan said that more is required "than simple
reference to Reynolds"5 to declare a county unconstitutionally dis-
tricted. In Brouwer v. Bronkema,"1 the Michigan court found the
equal protection clause itself to be the only sufficiently broad base for
the extension of "one man-one vote" to the local level. Mere reliance
on the Reapportionment Cases was deemed inappropriate because those
cases involved a citizen's right at a level of government, which no
one could dispute was required to be representative in character, where-
as there is no similar federally protected right to vote for legislative
officers of subordinate political divisions. Hence, the court relied on
the equal protection clause because it extended its protection to all rights
granted from any state or federal source and was not limited to the
protection of only fundamental constitutional rights.
In New York, the initial issues of county apportionment are no
longer debated. With the law settled by Seaman v. Fedourich2 that
counties must abide by the commands of equal representation, the lower
state courts need only determine the amount of deviation from the
"one man-one vote" standard which is constitutionally permissible.
To date, ten New York counties have been declared malappor-tioned
by state courts ;53 one, by a federal district court. 4
must do so to a legislative body apportioned to the same "basic constitutional
standard."The cogency of the above syllogism has been approved in Weinstein, Effect of the
Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal
Government, 65 COLUM. L. RZv. 21, 27 (1965), and questioned in Note, Reapportion-
ment, 79 HAXv. L. Rzv. 1226, 1270 (1966).
50. In Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98, 107 (1966), the
court stated:
It is not quite accurate to conclude, as did the trial judge in Seaman v.Fedourich (1965), 45 Misc. 2d 940, 258 N.Y.S.2d 152, that Reynolds v. Sims
and its companion cases stand for the proposition that the Equality Clause requires
apportionment on an equal population basis of all elected legislative bodies, eventhose of subordinate political subdivisions of a state [cites cases]. . . . More
is required than simple reference to Reynolds.
51. 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966). The oft-cited decision of the CircuitCourt for Kent County which declared the apportionment of seats on the Kent CountyBoard of Supervisors violative of the fourteenth amendment was affirmed by adivided court. It is interesting that in Sailors v. Board of Education, 254 F. Supp. 17(W.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), a Michigan federal district court
refused to entertain a suit challenging on fourteenth amendment grounds the appor-tionment of the local school board in Kent County, because the Supreme Court had
not yet ruled on malapportionment of boards and agencies of states and their sub-divisions, while the state court found this no barrier.
52. 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E. 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
53. Michl v. Shanklin, 50 Misc. 2d 460, 270 N.Y.S2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd,270 N.Y.S.2d 405; Grove v. Chemung County Bd. of Supervisors, 50 Misc. 2d 418,
270 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Graham v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Misc. 2d 459,267 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors,49 Misc. 2d 116, 266 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Dona v. Board of Supervisors,48 Misc. 2d 876, 266 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Treiber v. Lanigan, 48 Misc. 2d434, 264 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct, 1965) ; Barzelay v. Board of Supervisors, 47 Misc.2d 1013, 263 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Augostini v. Lasky, 46 Misc. 2d 1058,262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1965) ; Shilbury v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Misc. 2d 837,
260 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
54. Bianchi v. Griffing, 256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S.
97 (1967).
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When Moody v. Flowers returns to the Supreme Court properly
presented, the Court may settle the fate of the multitudinous varieties of
local governmental units. The fact that these units vary greatly in size
and function prohibits the enunciation of a principle equally applicable
to all of these bodies. However, the Supreme Court has been shown a
clear path to decision by the almost unanimous holdings of the state
courts applying the "one man-one vote" principle to those bodies which
exercise general governmental functions, perform legislative duties, and
are elected by citizens of the area they serve. A decision holding that
Reynolds applies in such circumstances would reach over 38,000
counties, cities, towns, and townships and would secure for citizens
in those areas equal representation on the boards and councils which
make the day-to-day decisions which have a great impact on the lives
of the vast majority of citizens throughout the country.
